Introduction
The complex security environment makes unity of command difficult to achieve at the strategic level. Unity of effort, therefore, has become the central means of ensuring unified strategic direction. Conditions usually inherent in peace operations--such as an increased number of actors, an ad hoc nature of command, force and sustainment arrangements, an inability to impose unity of command, and a more complex civilmilitary dimension--complicate the ability to achieve unity of effort at the strategic or, frequently, operational level. 1 Unity of effort among allies and partners is increasingly important to national governments because of reductions in forces, as well as the increased demand for peacekeeping operations in a transnational world. As a result, the role of international coalitions and alliances has dramatically expanded:
In today's security environment, two trends contribute to the growing importance and relevance of collective action. First, the scale of transnational problems far exceeds the ability and willingness of any one nation or organization to respond. Second, new technologies have made possible new linkages between nations and organizations--linkages that can facilitate increased cooperation. 2 Because of these difficulties and demands for collective action, the issue of unity of effort cannot be left to chance.
Such common purpose can be achieved only by intent and through design. The means to achieve unity of effort at the strategic level, specifically within multinational peace operations, has become a key issue facing defense officials and military practitioners.
To provide insights into resolving this conundrum, this paper will first examine the nuances of unity of command and unity of effort. The next section explores how to promote focus by analyzing the key elements that assist in that effort: the actors and fora, unity among allies and national partners, unity of effort within the U.S. government, unity of effort within the military, and unity with civil-military operations. The third section examines how mechanisms, particularly structures, alliances, and agreements; shared information; liaison; common doctrine; and planning contribute to focus. The paper closes with conclusions and recommendations.
Understanding Concepts
Doctrinally, unity of command refers to interlocking web of responsibility which is the foundation of trust, coordination, and teamwork necessary for unified military action. It requires clear delineation of responsibility among commanders--up, down, and laterally.
Unity of effort, on the other hand, is defined as coordination and cooperation among all forces, not necessarily part of the same command structure, toward a commonly recognized objective. 4 Multinational unity of effort includes the principles of common understanding, coordinated policy, and trust and confidence among nations.
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The essence of both unity of command and unity of effort is found in a clearly established, common focus, which will be the major thread of the discussion that follows.
Strive for Focus: Clear Aims and Objectives
The Actors and the Fora
The clear articulation of aims and objectives and the resulting strategic focus are prerequisites for unity of effort.
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But articulating aims and objectives is no easy task. Indeed, growing collective actions between nations and multiagencies will increase the complexity of achieving focus. As J. David Whaley,
Resident Representative of the United Nations (UN) Development
Programme in South Africa, notes:
A critical lack of clarity exits... [causing] confusion at the institutional and the operational level; this is particularly true with respect to the relative responsibilities and mandates of the different actors involved in international assistance and cooperation, different departments and agencies of the UN and other multilateral bodies, bilateral actors and the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community.
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To achieve unity of effort within multinational peace operations, therefore, strategic leaders must first understand the actors, their interaction, and the significance of cooperative and innovative means used to achieve focus. 
Focus and Unity Among Government Agencies
Recent growth in peace operations has challenged government agencies to work more closely with other agencies in a multiagency environment to achieve peacemaking and peacekeeping objectives. Unity of effort within the U.S. government should be easier to achieve, especially when each agency works toward common objectives defined by National Security Strategy (NSS).
But is this the case?
The complexity of responsibilities and interactions between agencies has drawn mixed reviews. For example, interagency cooperation during the Haiti operation was a marked improvement over Somalia. Furthermore, while economic and commerce representatives may attend some NSC IAWG sessions, they lack a coordinating mechanism for consistent decisionmaking within the NSC staff.
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A key element of the interagency process is to ensure the appropriate integration of instruments of power--integration which is critical for success in any multinational peace operation. Because strategic endeavors theoretically involve applying all instruments of national power (political, economic, diplomatic, psychological, and military), suitable instruments must be carefully blended to achieve success.
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Blending begins at the highest levels--at the national level--through strategy development (e.g., National Security Strategy (NSS),
Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs)). Selected instruments also must be applied properly in the theater of operation. A CINC's strategy, therefore, must be derived from and consonant with national strategy.
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Instruments of power will affect each other and, consequently, "success in complex contingency operations requires that all aspects of a crisis--political, security, humanitarian, economic-be addressed in a coordinated fashion nearly simultaneously."
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Failure to integrate instruments adequately can lead to ill-focused strategy. The Somalia operation illustrates this shortcoming, where a lack of focus resulted in the economic instrument of power working against the political-military instruments of power. In this case, the U.S. humanitarian relief monetization strategy 14 had the greatest potential to end the economic chaos in Somalia. But it was widely misunderstood;
subsequently, military and humanitarian aims were not achieved.
Writing about the "economics of chaos" in Somalia, Andrew S.
Natsios, Vice-President of Worldvision Relief and Development observed that:
The chaos and relief effort together conspired unknowingly to create a set of pernicious incentives which simultaneously corrupted...the merchant class...increased the demand for weapons...caused an increase in supply...reinforced power of...the warlords.
To preclude similar future failure, the U.S. needs to change the law to expand the NSC by formally adding, at a minimum, the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce. This will help ensure the international and national economic instruments of power are fully integrated at the highest level. Furthermore, the NSC staff must fully integrate all the appropriate economic considerations into plans and policy development.
16
Ultimately, the issue of unity of effort within the U.S. government devolves to the problem of focus, which can be achieved through proper assignment of all agencies' responsibility and authority.
Focus and Unity Within the Military
The third issue is unity of effort within the U. Thus, the development of a CINC's strategic document offers one way to improve strategic and operational focus--which ultimately impacts directly on unity of effort in regional peace operations. 
Focus and Unity With Civil-Military Operations

Developing Structures and Mechanisms that Contribute to Focus and Coordination
These efforts, alone, may not be sufficient to ensure adequate unity of effort. Structures and mechanisms that promote coordination and enhance focus also will need to be developed or sustained. Such mechanisms include developing and maintaining alliances and agreements, developing shared information, liaison, common doctrine and planning. The contingency operation in the Persian Gulf provided neither the time, personnel, nor political will to develop an integrated command structure. Instead, General Schwarzkopf, in conjunction with Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan, developed a dual command structure for the coalition that would provide the requisite unity of effort. ...both a process and a structure. As a process, it equips the alliance to assemble and groom forces and capabilities to operate together. As a structure, it provides a command and control architecture for NATO to direct and employ a combined (coalition) operation...CJTF is a concept enabling NATO's member nations to deal effectively with issues that fall outside of the alliance's traditional boundaries; moreover, it provides a mechanism through which both NATO and non-NATO nations can participate in expanded coalition activities. 
Develop and Maintain Alliances and Agreements
Develop Shared Information
Various national forces will adapt unevenly to the Information Age. Therefore, special arrangements will be necessary for ensuring unity of effort within alliances and coalitions.
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Information is shared not only through technology and information systems; it also must be shared with different cultures, among nations, or between governments and nongovernmental organizations. Thus, while technology will enhance information sharing, the need to interface and conduct face-to-face coordination will not diminish. In an environment of increasing multinational and multiagency operations--where decisionmaking from the national level to the theater level and from the theater strategic to the tactical level is compressed--effective mechanisms (as will be discussed later) are needed to overcome barriers to shared information. 
Common doctrine
Another way of improving integration and interoperability and thereby achieving unity of effort is through common doctrine.
Doctrine provides military organizations with a common philosophy, language, and purpose. The presence of representatives from the humanitarian community (OFDA [Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance], NGOs, UN agencies) at all levels during the planning process, and particularly with the units who will actually perform the mission, would have a positive effect on subsequent military-humanitarian relations. Whilst each institution has their own unique requirements and missions, sufficient interests exist to create a functioning partnership prior to operations in the field. Planning among nations is also essential to unity of effort.
Comparison of the planning for the Somalia and Haiti peace operations, for example, highlights the impact and importance of quality planning. In Somalia, even though the operation was supported by a UN resolution, little planning was done by the UN.
Further, U.S. planning on behalf of the UN was not effectively integrated. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
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A national commitment to preventive defense and preventive diplomacy will generate increased U.S. participation in multinational operations that will include military and civilian organizations. The frequency, complexity and scope of multinational and multiagency coordination has significantly challenged the ability of strategic leaders to achieve unity of effort. While this study has focused on unity of effort in peace operations, the utility of the issues discussed can apply to other types of operations: humanitarian assistance operations, Andrew S. Natsios, "Humanitarian Relief Interventions in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos," International Peacekeeping 3, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 81-84. The monetization strategy in Somalia had the greatest potential for turning around the situation in Somalia. The strategy was complex and barriers were underestimated. The monetization strategy is best understood byexamining the objectives. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) strategy in Southern Somalia had 5 critical objectives: stop the starvation and then stabilize the food prices; increase the security of the relief effort; discourage the exodus of Somalis from their villages and encourage resettlement; mass employment programmes to get young men off the street, get the economy going and rehab the ruined infrastructure; and decentralize the relief effort to the smaller cities and villages. 15 Ibid., 79.
The NSC is made up of four statutory members: President, Vice-President, Secretaries of State and Defense. Presidential Decision Directive 2, " Organization of the National Security Council," 20 January 1993, identifies additional permanent members to include the Secretary of Treasury, U.S. Representative (with Ambassador status to the UN), Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (extracted from Joint Pub 3-07.6 Draft, Chapter II, "Organization and Interagency Coordination," 1 March 1996, II-2). Although the PDD gives some legitimacy for economic representation on the NSC, it does not fully bind (by law) the members to the NSC. Changing of the statutory law will fully integrate the agency and the instruments of power. Some critics of this proposal will argue that the addition of the two Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce will complicate an already complex national decisionmaking apparatus. This proposal and its development is beyond the scope of this paper. However, if we are committed to a fully collaborative, integrated use of the instruments of power, then perhaps it is time to give equal consideration to all instruments, particularly, economic. At a minimum, the IAWGs must continue to assess and include this instrument of power in its consideration to preclude failures as the U.S. experienced in Somalia. James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Force Quarterly, 13 (Autumn 1996): 13. Additional authority included organizing commands and forces, employing forces, employing forces, assigning command functions to subordinate commanders, coordinating and approving aspects of administration and support, selecting and suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial. 
